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Governing others: Anomaly and the algorithmic subject of security 
Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke 
Abstract 
As digital technologies and algorithmic rationalities have increasingly reconfigured security 
practices, critical scholars have drawn attention to their performative effects on the temporality 
of law, notions of rights, and understandings of subjectivity. This article proposes to explore 
how the ‘other’ is made knowable in massive amounts of data and how the boundary between 
self and other is drawn algorithmically. It argues that algorithmic security practices and Big 
Data technologies have transformed self/other relations. Rather than the enemy or the risky 
abnormal, the ‘other’ is algorithmically produced as anomaly. Although anomaly has been 
often used interchangeably with abnormality and pathology, a brief genealogical reading of the 
concept shows that it works as a supplementary term, which reconfigures the dichotomies of 
normality/abnormality, friend/enemy, and identity/difference. By engaging with key practices 
of anomaly detection by intelligence and security agencies, the article analyses the 
materialisation of anomalies as specific spatial ‘dots’, temporal ‘spikes’ and topological 
‘nodes’. We argue that anomaly is not simply indicative of more heterogeneous modes of 
othering in times of Big Data, but represents a mutation in the logics of security that challenge 
our extant analytical and critical vocabularies. 
Keywords: algorithms, Big Data, security, self/other, surveillance, anomaly 
 
Introduction 
On 5 November 2009, Major Nidal Hasan opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort 
Hood, Texas, killing thirteen people and injuring forty-three.1 Three independent inquiries 
commissioned by the DoD, US Senate and the FBI in the wake of the attack debated whether 
it was a case of terrorism, an instance of violent (Islamic) extremism, or simply workplace 
violence. These debates were underpinned by media speculation about Nidal Hasan’s possible 
motivations and whether he was influenced by religious beliefs, objections to the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, mental problems or secondary trauma.2 Less public debate emerged 
around the role of digital technologies and information, as a consensus seemed to exist around 
the need for digital innovation and better information sharing. The FBI’s own inquiry 
highlighted ‘the ever-increasing challenge that electronic communications pose to the FBI's 
                                                     
1 Department of Defence, Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, (DoD: 2010)   available at: 
{http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce-
Web_Security_HR_13Jan10.pdf} accessed  30 June 2016. 
2 Kenneth T MacLeish, Making War at Fort Hood: Life and uncertainty in a military community  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013),  p. 186. 
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efforts to identify and avert potentially destructive activity’.3 The US Senate inquiry, led by 
Senator Joseph I. Lieberman and entitled ‘Ticking Time Bomb’, looked for clues that the FBI 
had available but missed given that it lacked access to the totality of the information or failed 
to ‘connect the dots’.4  
What went largely unnoticed in this consensus about connecting the dots and information 
exchange was the DARPA initiative in the wake of the Fort Hood attacks called Anomaly 
Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS). In its funding call, DARPA identifies a problem of 
Big Data for anticipatory security action: 
there are about 65,000 personnel at Fort Hood. […]. Under a few simple assumptions, 
we can show that the data collected for one year would result in a graph containing 
roughly 4,680,000,000 links between 14,950,000 nodes. There are currently no 
established techniques for detecting anomalies in data sets of this size at acceptable 
false positive rates.5  
Since then, anomaly detection has emerged as a key area of interest for security professionals. 
Documents made public by Snowden show that anomaly detection names the promise of Big 
Data to capture the ‘unknown unknowns’ and departs from digital techniques that concentrate 
on analysing known suspects or profiling risky individuals. The UK government, for instance, 
has argued that access to bulk data allows the intelligence agencies to search for ‘traces of 
activity by individuals who may not yet be known to the agencies…or to identify potential 
threats and patterns of activity that might indicate national security concern’.6 The role of 
anomaly detection for security agencies in the UK has also been confirmed in a recent review 
of the Investigatory Powers Bill.7 Computer scientists reinforce the centrality of anomaly 
detection, declaring it ‘a vital task, with numerous high-impact applications in areas such as 
security, finance, health care, and law enforcement’.8 DARPA’s initiative itself envisaged 
anomaly detection to ‘translate to significant, and often critical, actionable information in a 
wide variety of application domains’.9 Recent job descriptions for NSA data scientists also list 
anomaly detection among the essential skills required: ‘data mining tools and/or machine 
                                                     
3 William H. Webster Commission, Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009  
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012) available at: {https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=717443} accessed on 
15 July 2017,  p. 8. 
4 Joseph I Lieberman Ticking Time Bomb: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the US Government's Failure to 
Prevent the Fort Hood Attack (2011) available at: 
{https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf} accessed on 16 July 2017. 
5 DARPA, ‘Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS)’, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 
2010)   available at: {https://www.fbo.gov/download/2f6/2f6289e99a0c04942bbd89ccf242fb4c/DARPA-BAA-
11-04_ADAMS.pdf}  accessed  26 February 2016. 
6 UK Home Department, ‘Draft Investigatory Powers Bill’, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, (2015)   available 
at: 
{https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Po
wers_Bill.pdf } accessed  16 July 2017, p. 20. 
7 David Anderson Q.C., ‘Report of the Bulk Powers Reviews’, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’, 
(2016)   available at: {https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Bulk-Powers-Review-final-report.pdf}  accessed  30 August 2016. 
8 Leman Akoglu, Hanghang Tong, and Danai Koutra, ‘Graph based anomaly detection and description: a survey’, 
Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery 29: 3 (2015),   p. 626. 
9 DARPA (2010), p. 2. 
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learning tools to search for data identification, characteristics, trends, or anomalies without 
having apriori knowledge of the data or its meaning’.10 
Anomaly detection speaks to the promise of Big Data to compute data at scale and find patterns 
and correlations that could reveal the ‘needle in the haystack’. At first sight, it appears as 
another mode of anticipatory and preemptive security, which has been explored in critical 
approaches to security and surveillance.11 While anomaly detection partakes in the promise to 
capture the ‘unknown unknowns’ of anticipatory security, we argue that it also transforms the 
logics of friend/enemy, identity/difference, and normality/abnormality in security practices. By 
attending to the specificities of anomaly detection, this article shows how the ‘other’ is 
algorithmically enacted as an anomaly when computers are ‘[d]igesting vast amounts of data 
and spotting seemingly subtle patterns’.12  
How are self/other relations made knowable when security agencies use Big Data 
technologies? Despite the role of anomaly detection in both secret and official security 
discourses, anomalies have received scant analytical attention. While critical scholars have 
analysed how digital technologies constitute algorithmic subjects of (in)security, these have 
mostly been rendered as ‘data doubles’ and Gilles Deleuze’s ‘dividuals’, or equated with 
categories of the enemy or the suspicious abnormal.13 Moreover, the opacity, illegibility and 
secrecy of algorithmic and security practices have concealed the ‘lines of discrimination and 
partition’ in Big Data.14 We argue that anomaly detection is indicative of the transformation of 
the algorithmic subjects of security, as it is equivalent neither to abnormality nor to enmity. 
Anomaly emerges as a supplementary third term, which reconfigures logics of security away 
from dichotomies of friend/enemy, identity/difference and normal/abnormal towards logics of 
similarity/dissimilarity.15     
                                                     
10NSA, ‘Data Scientist. Job Description’,  (2016)   available at: 
{https://www.nsa.gov/psp/applyonline/EMPLOYEE/HRMS/c/HRS_HRAM.HRS_CE.GBL?Page=HRS_CE_J
OB_DTL&Action=A&JobOpeningId=1076263&SiteId=1&PostingSeq=1}  accessed  16 October 2016. 
11 Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and security beyond probability  (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2014); Marieke de Goede, Speculative Security: The Politics of Pursuing Terrorist Monies  
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, Politics of 
Catastrophe: Genealogies of the unknown  (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Zygmunt Bauman et al., ‘After 
Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance’, International Political Sociology 8, no. 2 (2014), pp. 21-144; 
Didier Bigo, ‘The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/Navy – 
border guards/police – database analysts’, Security Dialogue 45: 3 (2014), pp. 209-225; Jef Huysmans, 
‘Democratic curiosity in times of surveillance’, European Journal of International Security 1: 1 (2016), pp. 73-
93; David Lyon, Surveillance After Snowden  (Cambridge: Polity, 2015). 
12 Steve Lohr, Data-ism: The Revolution Transforming Decision Making, Consumer Behavior, and Almost 
Everything Else  (New York: Harper Collins, 2015),  p. 8. 
13 The digitisation of identity and the body as data have been key areas of critical research around biometrics, 
mobility, and border control. See for example Charlotte Epstein, ‘Guilty Bodies, Productive Bodies, Destructive 
Bodies: Crossing the Biometric Borders’, International Political Sociology 1: 2 (2007), pp. 149-164; Benjamin 
J. Muller, Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies  (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
In this paper, we are interested in the epistemic production of subjects of (in)security through algorithmic 
techniques that move beyond the biometric identification of individuals to compute massive, structured and 
unstructured, data at scale. See Louise Amoore (2013); David Lyon, ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and big data: 
capacities, consequences, critique’, Big Data & Society 1: 2 (2014), pp. 1-13; Claudia Aradau and Tobias 
Blanke, ‘The (Big) Data-security assemblage: Knowledge and critique’, Big Data & Society 2:2 (2015), pp. 1-
12; Jeremy W Crampton, ‘Collect it all: national security, Big Data and governance’, GeoJournal 80: 4 (2015), 
pp. 519-531. 
14 Louise Amoore (2013). p. 113. 
15 We use logics here in Foucault’s sense of ‘the logic of connections between the heterogeneous’. Michel 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979  (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008),   p. 42. 
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To understand how anomaly detection articulates logics of security today, the paper proceeds 
in three stages. In a first stage, we discuss the production of otherness in security practices and 
the recent emergence of anomaly detection in algorithmic security practices. Secondly, we 
develop a brief genealogy of anomaly to conceptualise its specificity and difference from both 
enmity and abnormality. Thirdly, we unpack the digital production of anomalies as ‘dots, 
spikes and nodes’ to trace emerging logics of algorithmic security. If the binary of 
identity/difference has underpinned critical analyses of security practices, the production of 
others as anomalies recasts security logics as similarity/dissimilarity and requires us to revisit 
extant analytical and critical vocabularies in security studies. We conclude with reflections on 
the political consequences of anomalies for the algorithmic governance of insecurity.  
Subjects of security, techniques of othering  
Critical approaches to (in)security have shown that security practices and discourses are 
constitutive of the relation between ‘self’ and ‘other(s)’, with difference recast as dangerous or 
risky, potentially disruptive and destructive. When David Campbell asks: ‘what functions have 
difference, danger, and otherness played in constituting the identity of the United States as a 
major actor in international politics?’, the implication is that difference morphs into dangerous 
otherness.16 Thus, security studies are defined by this specific metamorphosis producing ‘a 
context where oppositional violence against the Other exists’.17 The transformation of 
difference into otherness and the practices of othering as co-constitutive of security have been 
at the heart of critical debates, which have recognised that security entails ‘the normalization 
or extirpation of difference’.18  
Critical security studies have offered nuanced analyses of the architecture of enmity that 
security practices enact and its political effects. Securitisation theory, for instance, has been 
underpinned by a logic of war and friend/enemy construction. Through securitising speech 
acts, war and security are intimately linked through ‘a manifestation of contest wherein an 
“other” is conceived and constructed as enemy, the target of violent acts’.19 The implication of 
the war-like logic of securitization is that it ‘constitutes political unity by means of placing it 
in an existentially hostile environment and asserting an obligation to free it from threat’.20 It 
relies on narratives of stable and cohesive identity and it requires the indefinite and endless 
policing of boundaries.21 While the friend/enemy relation has underpinned analyses of security 
and war, critical security scholars have also argued that security practice enact more 
heterogeneous forms of otherness. Moving beyond the securitisation of radical otherness, Lene 
Hansen has proposed to analyse ‘how the Other is situated within a web of identities rather 
than in a simple Self-Other duality’.22 The pluralisation of identity and difference captures the 
plurality of cultural representations beyond the friend/enemy binary. (In)security is co-
                                                     
16 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992),  p.  7. 
17 Michael C. Williams and Keith  Krause, ‘Preface: Toward Critical Security Studies' in Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams (eds) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997) , p. xv. 
18 James Der Derian, Critical Practices in International Theory: Selected Essays  (London: Routledge, 2009),   p. 
151. Consequently, less antagonistic understandings of difference are needed to unmake security. 
19 Vivienne Jabri, War and the Transformation of Global Politics  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),   p. 
12. 
20 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU  (London: Routledge, 2006),   
p. 50.  
21 Maria Stern, ‘ “We” the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In)Security’, Security Dialogue 37:2 (2006), p. 
193. 
22 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War  (London: Routledge, 2006),  p. 
36. 
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constituted by ‘chronotopes’ of difference, where ‘others’ are spatially and temporally 
distanced.23 Thus, security discourses produce a complex gendered and racialised ‘architecture 
of abnormality and pathology’ and not just enmity.24  
These analyses of how the complex architecture of security is discursively performed have 
been supplemented by socio-technical ones attending to disperse enactments of (in)security 
through (epistemic) practices, techniques and devices.25 They have challenged the singular 
logic of security and binaries that securitisation theory entailed. For instance, Didier Bigo has 
recently shown that different categories of security professionals enact otherness by deploying 
heterogeneous security techniques. In his analysis of EU border security, the military/navy, the 
police/border guards and the database analysts do not only promote different narratives of threat, 
but they also rely on different technologies of defence, risk and data analysis.26 The 
militarisation of borders, which works with technologies of deterrence and discourse of 
enemies, is not universal or even dominant, but it comes into tension with practices and 
discourses that focus on managing populations and ‘filtering’ at the border or on using data 
analytics to govern at a distance both spatially and temporally. For the EU border guards, what 
matters is ‘to be able to filter and ‘lock and block’ some people (migrant travellers), for a 
certain period, with the goal of repatriating them as soon as possible’.27 They deploy practices 
of risk managing and filtering which do not enact the ‘other’ as an enemy, but as a potentially 
risky traveller. The logics of war, risk and data produce specific modes of otherness. The 
militarisation of the enemy is thus distinct from the profiling of the risky migrant or the data 
mining of computer scientists.28  
 
Critical analyses of algorithmic security and digital surveillance have also focused on 
techniques and devices that produce ‘data doubles’ through data patterns and associations. 
These have emphasised the work on profiling and normalisation that produce categories of 
‘undesirables’ and risky selves to be monitored, corrected or excluded based on the 
                                                     
23 Some of the literature on European integration has distinguished forms of spatial and temporal othering. E.g.  
Thomas Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: ReconsideringNormative Power Europe’, 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 33:3 (2005), pp. 319-335. For a critique of the distinction between 
space and time in the construction of Europe’s others, see Sergei Prozorov, ‘The other as past and present: 
beyond the logic of “temporal othering” in IR theory’, Review of International Studies 37: 03 (2011), pp. 1273-
1293. Barry Hindess has developed one of the most cogent articulations of the relation between time and others 
Barry Hindess, ‘The Past Is Another Culture’, International Political Sociology 1: 4 (2007), pp. 325-338.   
24 David Campbell (1992), p. 94. 
25 Thierry Balzacq et al., "Security Practices," ed. Robert A. Denemark, International Studies Encyclopedia 
(Blackwell, 2010),  available at: 
{http://www.isacompendium.com/public/book.html?id=g9781444336597_yr2013_978144433659}; Christian 
Bueger, ‘Making things known: epistemic practices, the United Nations, and the translation of piracy’, 
International Political Sociology 9: 1 (2015), pp. 1-18; Stephan Davidshofer, Julien Jeandesboz, and Francesco 
Ragazzi, ‘Technology and security practices: situating the 
technological imperative’, in Tugba Basaran et al. (eds) International Political Sociology: Transversal Lines, 
(London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 205-227; Jef Huysmans (2014); Didier Bigo, ‘Freedom and speed in enlarged 
borderzones’, in Vicki Squire (ed) The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity (London: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 31-50; Anthony Amicelle, Claudia Aradau, and Julien Jeandesboz, ‘Questioning security 
devices: performativity, resistance, politics’, Security Dialogue 46: 5 (2015), pp. 293-306. 
26 Didier Bigo (2014). 
27 Ibid., p. 216.  
28 This is not to say that these architectures of difference exist in separate worlds, as Bigo’s analysis of separate, 
but competing professional universes would indicate. On the distinction between an analysis focused on 
professionals and analyses of expertise see Gil Eyal and Grace Pok, ‘What is security expertise?’, in Trine 
Villumsen Berling and Christian Bueger (eds) Security Expertise: Practice, Power, Responsibility (London: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 37-59.  
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anticipation of future behaviour, while ‘normal’ citizens are integrated within the flows of 
capital.29 The subject of security is proactively produced through associations and patterns, so 
that we see a transformations from ‘biometric data anchored in the human body, apparently 
fixing and securing identity’ to digital traces that focus on human activity and that are typical 
to the some of the best-known Big Data applications.30 Even as Bernard Harcourt argues that 
a new ‘quantum leap’ has taken place from statistical techniques of categorisation to the 
digital age,  his diagnosis of algorithmic practices is that they aim ‘to find our perfect double, 
our hidden twin’.31 In the midst of digital mutations or even a digital revolution, practices of 
differentiation between self and other remain articulated in the language of abnormality or 
enmity, or pathology. The ‘data double’ or the digital twin appears ultimately a digital 
translation of analogue bodies, so that the algorithmic production of otherness is a mirror 
image of analogue abnormality. However, Grégoire Chamayou’s astute observation that 
‘activity becomes an alternative to identity’ in algorithmic practices of targeted enjoins us to 
revisit the transformation of self/other relations and the algorithmic redrawing of boundary 
lines.32  
To this purpose, we propose to attend to the language and practices of anomaly detection for 
the purposes of security governance. At first sight, the language of anomaly is folded onto the 
language of abnormality and risk in both academic and practitioners’ analyses of Big Data, 
algorithmic security and digital surveillance. Even when the DARPA initiative mentioned in 
the Introduction points out that anomaly detection would have made possible an alert and 
intervention ‘before the fact’, anomaly could be substituted for abnormality.33 Yet, a closer 
reading of practitioners’ textbooks, computing research, classified and declassified documents 
in the wake of the Snowden revelations suggests that something else is at stake in the hunt for 
anomalies. 
Colleen McCue, who is best known for her data mining work with law enforcement in the US, 
formulates this promise of anomaly detection in the statistical language of ‘outliers’: 
All outliers are not created equal. Should outliers universally be removed from the 
analysis or otherwise discounted? Or is an outlier or some other anomaly in the data 
worth considering? While most outliers represent some sort of error or other clutter in 
the data, some are extremely important. In my experience, deviation from normal when 
considering criminal justice or intelligence data often indicates something bad or a 
situation or person with significant potential for escalation.34 
                                                     
29 Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyon, Liquid Surveillance: a conversation  (Cambridge: Polity, 2013). The 
formulation of ‘data doubles’ is usually accredited to Haggerty and Ericson’s seminal article Kevin D Haggerty 
and Richard V Ericson, ‘The surveillant assemblage’, The British Journal of Sociology 51: 4 (2000), pp. 605-
622. 
30 Louise Amoore, ‘Biometric Borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror’, Political Geography 25: 3 
(2006), p. 339. 
31 Bernard E Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2015),   p. 343. 
32 Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone  (New York: The New Press, 2015),  p. 87. 
33 DARPA (2010), p. 6. 
34 Colleen McCue, Data Mining and Predictive Analysis: Intelligence Gathering and Crime Analysis, 2nd edition 
(Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2015),   p. 87. McCue is described in the media as a ‘pioneer in data analytics’ 
and credited with helping catch the Virginia sniper in 2011. Data-Smart City Solutions, ‘Dr. Colleen McCue: 
Pioneer in Data Analytics’,  (2013)   available at: {http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/dr.-colleen-
mccue-pioneer-in-data-analytics-133}  accessed  14 September 2016.  
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While McCue associates outliers with ‘deviation from the normal’, other security professionals 
indicate the specificity of anomalies as different from statistical abnormality. Many of the 
documents leaked by Snowden show a focus on anomaly detection in the intelligence agencies, 
as it bears the promise of capturing the ‘unknown unknowns’ within the mass of data. One of 
documents more recently released by Snowden, which maps the current technological 
capabilities developed by NSA and the GCHQ, develops a matrix that includes four key types 
of use cases: target discovery, target tracking, behaviour-based discovery and anomaly 
detection. The document points out that GCHQ’s and NSA’s Big Data techniques aim to find 
exactly these anomalies, which are the highlight of their new digital capacities.35 Their matrix 
of capabilities (Figure 1) is effectively a replica of Rumsfeld’s (in)famous matrix of known 
knowns, unknown knowns, and unknown unknowns. Anomaly detection therefore names the 
epistemic promise of Big Data to capture ‘new unidentified threats’ and do so at scale, as the 
Communication Security Establishment Canada also acknowledges.36 
 
 
Figure 1, GCHQ Capabilities37  
For security professionals, one of the greatest promises of Big Data is exactly that it appears to 
‘offer the possibility of finding suspicious activity by detecting anomalies or outliers’.38 A 
                                                     
35 GCHQ, ‘GCHQ Analytic Cloud Challenges’,  (2012)   available at: 
{https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/GCHQAnalyticCloudChallenges2015-09-25nsadocs}  accessed  20 
February 2016. 
36 CSEC, ‘CSEC SIGINT Cyber Discovery: Summary of the current effort’, Snowden Archive, (2010)   available 
at: {https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/CSECSIGINTCyberDiscoverySummaryofthecurrenteffort2015-
01-17nsadocs}  accessed  30 June 2016. 
37 GCHQ (2012). 
38 GCHQ, ‘HIMR Data Mining Research Problem Book’, Snowden Archive, (2011)   available at: 
{https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Problem-Book-Redacted.pdf}  accessed  27 April 
2016. 
 8 
report by the Heilbronn Mathematical Institute, revealed by Snowden in 2016, acknowledges 
that ‘[o]utliers (e.g. low-volume telephone numbers, small connected components) are often 
exactly what SIGINT is interested in’.39 In an earlier document detailing the capabilities of 
XKeyScore, the question ‘How do I find a cell of terrorists that has no connection to known 
strong-selectors?’ is answered by ‘Look for anomalous events’. Anomalous events are then 
illustrated by a series of examples: ‘Someone whose language is out of place for the region 
they are in; Someone who is using encryption; Someone searching the web for suspicious 
stuff’.40 The language of security professionals, borrowing from that of computer science, 
seamlessly moves from anomaly to outlier, to that which is of interest, ‘out of place’, or 
otherwise unusual. The next section develops a brief genealogy of anomaly to draw out its 
specificity as a third term that is not reducible to either abnormality or enmity.  
Anomalies: towards a genealogy 
The language of anomaly or outlier detection has been an increased focus in computational 
analysis, particularly in the field of machine learning in order to capture a shift away from 
statistical techniques of fitting observation to normal distributions. It is in this sense the 
anomaly detection appears to hold new promise for security professionals. In computing, 
anomaly detection problematises the relation with statistical risk calculations of normality and 
abnormality. Although outliers have been used in statistics since the 19th century,41 they have 
often not been a target for statistical analysis but have been regarded as noise, the dissonances 
that need to be eliminated for the normal pattern to emerge. Thus, the statistical language of 
outliers is connected with that of error or faulty method: 
An outlying observation may be merely an extreme manifestation of the random 
variability inherent in the data. ... On the other hand, an outlying observation may be 
the result of gross deviation from prescribed experimental procedure or an error in 
calculating or recording the numerical value.42    
The distinction between true and interesting outliers and noise was debated in 19th century 
statistics, with some suggesting that the distinction was impossible to make drawing on 
traditional statistics. Two schools of thought have been identified in the computer science 
conceptualisation and processing of anomalies and outliers.43 Following on from earlier 
debates in statistics, the first approach identifies outliers as errors or noise that has to be 
eliminated. The second approach, however, sees outliers as something interesting, which points 
to potentially relevant behaviour and observations that need to be investigated further. Through 
machine learning, the computing literature has departed from statistical considerations by 
developing an analytical interest in detecting anomalies or outliers not as a measure of error 
but as the very object of analysis. While statistics has considered anomalies as noise or 
‘abnormal data’ that risks ‘distorting the results of the analysis’, machine learning refocuses 
                                                     
39 Ibid., p. 30. 
40 NSA, ‘XKeyScore’, Snowden Archive, (2008)   available at: 
{https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/XKeyScore2013-07-31nsadocs}  accessed  30 June 2016. Compar 
anomaly detectiion with techniques of sensing that which is ‘out of place’. Aradau and van Munster (2011) 
Chapter 6. 
41 Varun Chandola, Arindam Banerjee, and Vipin Kumar, ‘Anomaly detection: A survey’, ACM Comput. Surv. 
41: 3 (2009), pp. 1-58. 
42 Frank E Grubbs, ‘Procedures for detecting outlying observations in samples’, Technometrics 11: 1 (1969) , p. 
1. 
43 Malik Agyemang, Ken Barker, and Rada Alhajj, ‘A comprehensive survey of numeric and symbolic outlier 
mining techniques’, Intelligent Data Analysis 10: 6 (2006), pp. 521-538. 
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the question of anomalies as the desirable results of analysis.44 This second approach has 
become central to the efforts of security agencies, where anomaly detection using Big Data is 
about the struggle to distinguish interesting outliers from simple noise and the fine distinctions 
in extreme value analysis, which are ‘collectively referred to as the distribution tail’.45 
Terrorism, cybersecurity, online fraud and critical infrastructure protection are often named as 
key areas for anomaly detection techniques.46 
As a recent article on anomaly detection notes, ‘knowing what stands out in the data is often at 
least, or even more important and interesting than learning about the general structure’.47 
Anomaly detection is the result of developing algorithmic techniques to look for ‘non-
conformant’ behaviour, for that which is different from computational regularities.48 Although 
the computing literature distinguishes between statistical techniques of outlier exclusion and 
machine learning techniques of outlier or anomaly detection, anomaly remains a rather elusive 
concept. We thus find a plethora of vocabularies around outliers considered as ‘abnormalities, 
discordants, deviants, or anomalies’.49 Anomalies and outliers are not only metaphorically 
defined as that which stands out, but are often used interchangeably.50 In another overview of 
anomaly detection in the computing literature, anomalies are metaphorically defined as the 
‘odd ones in the mist of data’.51 Ultimately, the computing literature is undergirded by the 
assumption that anomaly is ‘an observation (or subset of observations) which appears to be 
inconsistent with the remainder of that set of data’.52  Inconsistency, discrepancy, or oddity are 
indicative of a move away from statistical curves, averages and abnormals, on the one hand, 
and outliers as noise or error, on the other.  
To shed light on the implications of the use of anomalies and to clarify the epistemic 
implications of anomaly detection, we develop a brief genealogy of anomalies, which places 
them within the social and political debates about statistical knowledge more broadly. To this 
purpose, we revisit the statistical production of normality and abnormality and trace the 
emergence of a different discourse of anomaly. As Ian Hacking has noted, the 19th century swa 
the concept of the normal replace that of human nature to then become the ‘the most powerful 
ideological tool of the twentieth century’.53 The normal and the abnormal are historically 
specific inventions of ‘data-processing societies: only in cultures that continuously, routinely, 
comprehensively, and institutionally make themselves statistically transparent’.54 The concept 
of the normal emerged across several intersecting debates in statistics, sociology and medicine. 
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The normal and normality garnered different meanings depending on their constitutive 
relationship with abnormality. The abnormal was either placed on the continuum of normality 
or was considered as a different, discrete category.55 The distribution of abnormality as distance 
from the normal is attributed to Adolphe Quetelet’s invention of the ‘average individual’ based 
on temporal regularities and the Gaussian ‘normal curve’.  
These ideas of normality and abnormality were underpinned by normative ideas of desirable 
social norms across fields of knowledge and practices of governance. According to Nikolas 
Rose, 
Normality combined or aligned the register of the statistical – the central point in the 
normal distribution which captured the regularities found in populations of numbers – 
and the register of the social and moral – the judgments of authorities about the 
desirability of certain types of conduct – and located these twin registers in a medical 
field of judgments of health and illness’.56 
For Quetelet, the average man was the figure of the ‘prudent centrist’, who avoided excesses 
and typified a moderate, non-revolutionary society.57 If Quetelet did not envisage classifying 
individuals according to their distance from the normal, eugenicists such as Francis Galton and 
Karl Pearson were interested in the distribution of traits within the ‘deviation from the normal’ 
and comparison between individuals.58 It was ultimately the normal curve that made possible 
the classification of individuals in relation to their position within a group, ‘rather than by 
paying close attention to their essence, their nature, or their ideal state of being’.59 These 
classifications according to distributions of (ab)normality became pervasive in governing 
societies through risk. 
The language of anomaly is either absent from these analyses of normality or, when used, 
anomaly and abnormality appear interchangeable. The binaries of norm and anomaly, normal 
and abnormality fold into each other. The terminology of anomaly appears, however, in the 
historian of science Georges Canguilhem’s writings on the normal and pathological.60 
Canguilhem is one of the few to have noted the epistemic difference of anomaly as a term that 
cannot be collapsed into the abnormal or the pathological. He draws attention to an 
etymological error that has effaced the distinction between anomaly and abnormality in 
ordinary language. Unlike the normal and the abnormal, anomaly is not derived either from the 
Greek nomos or from the Latin norma. According to Canguilhem, ‘“anomaly” is, etymolog-
ically, an-omalos, that which is uneven, rough, irregular, in the sense given these words when 
speaking of a terrain’.61 Rather than normatively inscribed deviation from the normal, anomaly 
refers to what is simply irregular existence. Like a terrain, anomaly is an asperity, leading 
Canguilhem to argue that anomaly, unlike abnormality, is simply descriptive. While the 
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distinction descriptive/normative is problematic, Canguilhem’s retrieval of the specificity of 
anomaly in the history of medicine helps situate it as a supplementary term, irreducible to 
abnormality or pathology. In medicine, an anomaly is not necessarily as sign of disease of 
abnormal development. Moreover, an anomaly is not marked negatively as it can also mean an 
improvement of the normal. In an additional comparison, Canguilhem sees anomaly is ‘an 
irregularity like the negligible irregularities found in objects cast in the same mold’.62  
 
Another historian and philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, also distinguishes anomaly and 
abnormality in relation to ‘normal science’.63 An anomaly might be reconcilable with an 
existing paradigm or it might disrupt ‘normal science’. Kuhn emphasises that it is difficult to 
tell when an anomaly will trigger a ‘crisis’ for normal science. ‘Normal science’ is always 
faced with discrepancies and it can continue to function even in the face of anomalies. Yet, at 
times, anomalies can call into question normal paradigms. Kuhn’s analysis of normal science 
and anomaly points to an implicit tripartite relation between normality, abnormality and 
anomaly. An anomaly can become an abnormality that asks for a revision of the normal 
paradigm and the constitution of a different one. Yet, anomaly need not be in opposition to 
what counts as normal science. 
Anomalies and outliers are in excess of the binaries and boundaries of normality and 
abnormality. Even though vocabularies of anomaly have not received much analytical 
attention, anomalies have become increasingly problematised in different social worlds, from 
neuroscience to Big Data. Nikolas Rose has suggested that, in the context of neuroscience, 
there has been a mutation from the binary of normality and abnormality to variation as the 
norm and anomaly without abnormality.64 For security professionals, anomaly detection names 
the promise of Big Data and algorithms to capture discrepancies from the general patterns and 
tendencies in security data. Anomaly detection has thus emerged as one of the techniques that 
has addressed the limitations of statistical knowledge and risk governmentality.65  
Rather than statistical abnormalities or deviations from the norm, anomalies emerge as a 
supplementary term that reconfigures the dichotomy of normal/abnormal. An anomaly is a 
discrepancy or dissimilarity rather than a disruption of the norm. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
formulation, an anomaly is ‘less a subtraction from regulation than from regularity’.66 
Anomalies do not assume categorisations of ‘high risk’ or ‘at risk’ groups and do not work 
with stabilised social norms. They name the discrepancy from and within patterns understood 
as a modulation of differences and similarities rather than ‘a series of identical items’.67 We 
argue that anomalies reconfigure the logic of normality/abnormality from one based on 
averages and deviation from the normal to one of similarity and dissimilarity. If anomalies are 
a dissonance, discrepancy or dissimilarity, computers will need to first produce similarity. 
Techniques of anomaly detection simultaneously recast the normal as the similar and anomaly 
as the dissimilar. They rely on the existence of variation in data without starting from 
assumptions or modes of normality and abnormality. It is in this sense that we can understand 
the shift from statistical bell curves and average to the ‘structure of the normal patterns in a 
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given data set’.68 Computational anomaly detection techniques are all focused on first learning 
similarity and then recognising what is dissimilar, dissonant or discrepant. Anomaly detection 
also indicates a mutation in the categories of identity and difference as it does not presume 
homogeneity, consistency or stability, but continuously mutating variation.  
In order to understand the transformation of identity/difference, normal/abnormal, 
friend/enemy in security practices through the production of anomalies, the next section 
explores three widely-used algorithmic techniques of anomaly detection. By attending to these 
key techniques, we develop a ‘thick description’ of how anomalous ‘others’ are enacted 
through algorithmic security practices and flesh out their political implications for governing 
insecurity.69 
Anomaly detection: dots, spikes and nodes 
This section shows how anomalies are actualised as dots, spikes and nodes through spatial, 
temporal and topological algorithmic techniques. These three techniques dominate the debates 
on anomaly detection in computing and are also key to security practices, as the Snowden 
documents and public reports on intelligence and Big Data indicate. While there is no universal 
anomaly detection algorithm, ‘many techniques employed for detecting outliers are 
fundamentally identical but with different names’.70 The production of dots, spikes and nodes 
can be seen as representative of three computational conceptualisations of anomalies as point, 
contextual and collective anomalies.71 Point anomalies are those dots that lie outside 
computational regularity or similarity of all the data under consideration. Conditional 
anomalies depend on a particular context and appear as discrepancies relative to that context. 
For instance, a spike in the context of otherwise continuous communication activities can 
indicate anomalous behaviour. Collective anomalies finally occur when an individual 
observation needs to be analysed in combination with others to demonstrate anomalousness. 
Collective anomalies can be captured once we consider networks and connectivities. The 
production of anomalous dots, spikes and nodes has elements of all computational 
conceptualisations of anomalies and are often employed together if, for instance, clustering is 
used as a preparation for selecting nodes in networks as anomalies.72 Nevertheless, a focus on 
one technique for each conceptualization allows us to explore the specificity of anomaly 
detection within algorithmic techniques for security governance.  
Clustering dots 
Clustering is one of the key techniques of filtering and sorting digital data in computing. At 
first sight, clustering is reminiscent of statistical classification, which produces groups of 
populations as being ‘at risk’, ‘high risk’ or ‘low risk’. Yet, rather than sorting populations 
within statistical categories of risk, which differentiate the normal from the abnormal, 
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clustering produces patterns of similarity and anomalies as dissimilar dots or discrepancies. 
Algorithmic clustering techniques represent data points as dots in an artificial geometric space 
commonly referred to as ‘feature space’ and then find similarities between different data points. 
Clustering is a prime machine learning example of unsupervised learning, whereby a computer 
learns to distinguish anomalies from the data at hand and is not supervised in this process by 
an analyst. It does not presuppose any dominant normal and does not rely on past calculations 
of normality and abnormality: regularity is derived through proximity in the feature space, 
while anomalies are outside of or at a distance from any cluster.73 
Clustering uses the feature space to map dots and geometrically determine which points, as 
determined by their features, are ‘far away’ from the rest.74 Thus, outlier or anomaly detection 
through clustering attends to the ‘non-membership of a data point in any cluster, its distance 
from other clusters, and the size of the closest cluster’.75 As a technique for filtering data and 
partitioning an abstract feature space, clustering is based on the computation of geometrical 
distances or ‘between-ness’ of a the shortest path between data points.76 Clustering techniques 
need to first derive regularities through patterns of similarity and then determine those points 
that are absolutely outside of this normality as they are far away from the normal clustering in 
the feature space. The feature space is the equivalent of Canguilhem’s terrain and its 
(un)eveness. Clustering is heavily reliant on the collection of large amounts of data that can 
produce distance measures that distinguish patterns of similarity and anomaly. According to 
the leaked report by the Heilbronn Mathematical Institute, GCHQ uses the BIRCH clustering 
algorithm that can work with very large datasets for security applications, as it ‘utilizes 
measurements that capture the natural closeness of data’77.  
The difference between statistical techniques of classification and algorithmic techniques of 
clustering can be traced by juxtaposing two cases of data-driven policing. One of the examples 
of early use of computational techniques is the capture of Rolf Heissler, one of the Red Army 
Fraction (RAF) members, in Frankfurt in 1979. The attributes for classification that the police 
used was payment by cheque, credit card or in cash. Based on these classifications, the 
Frankfurt police acquired lists of energy bill payments. They found 18,000 payments in cash, 
which they then reclassified against lists from other hire companies. The cross-checks led to 
two matches, a drug dealer and Rolf Heissler, and subsequently to Heissler’s capture.78 In the 
recent context of Big Data driven-policing, McCue has shown how feature-based clustering 
techniques can detect anomalies to support counter-terrorism.79 She offers an example of 
monitoring conference calls linked to an unpaid bill. The features selected by police analysts 
included ‘the conference IDs (a unique number assigned by the conference call company), the 
participants’ telephone numbers, the duration of the calls, and the dates’.80 As represented in 
Figure 2, the cluster analysis helped find ‘three groups or clusters (…) based on the day of the 
month that the conference occurred and the number of participants involved in a particular 
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call’.81 Through clustering, the anomalous calls emerge as the ones early in the month and with 
a smaller number of participants. If in the case of RAF counter-terrorism, the Frankfurt police 
relied on previous tips to classify categories of suspect and non-suspect transactions, in 
McCue’s example of telephone calls, there isn’t initially anything that would render the calls 
early in the month and with less participants more suspect than calls later in the month with 
more participants. However, the algorithmic techniques of clustering reveal these calls as 
anomalous and requiring attention.  
 
 
Figure 2 Clustering for anomaly detection82  
 
Anomaly detection activates a mode of reasoning where similarity through proximity has come 
to define the norm of security, while the anomalous dot or collection of dots are non-proximate. 
The production of an algorithmic norm as similarity and anomaly as discrepancy or 
dissimilarity means that a lot of data needs to be collected before anomaly detection can begin, 
which makes mass surveillance a necessity. Security analytics with Big Data thus always 
implies the collection and processing of data about as many individuals as possible. Even as 
security professionals have rejected the language of ‘mass surveillance’ in favour of the less 
intrusive ‘bulk powers’, clustering implies that effectively data is collected on large groups of 
populations so that it can be represented in the feature space for similarities and dissimilarities 
to emerge.  
Timing spikes 
A second method of anomaly detection focuses on time, modelled as a series or a collection of 
observations xt, recorded at time t. If feature spaces are multi-dimensional spaces, time series 
will also use distance to represent data, but on the single dimension of a time axis. Time series 
analysis calculates changes over time and models these as functions of certain points or periods 
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of time according to the time axis. Time series analytics relies on data that is ‘sequential, i.e., 
the contextual attribute of a data instance is its position in the sequence’.83  
Time series analysis has a long military and security history that precedes the uses of Big Data. 
The history of signal intelligence is linked to not just to cryptology and decryption, but to so-
called traffic analysis as ‘the study of “external” features of target communications’.84 Traffic 
analysis had been an important source of intelligence as it ‘deduces the lines of command of 
military or naval forces by ascertaining which radios talk to which. And since military 
operations are usually accompanied by an increase in communications, traffic analysis can 
infer the imminence of such operations by watching the volume of traffic’.85 Traffic analysis 
depended on an a priori understanding of the enemy; it focused on naval and military forces 
and aimed to trace their actions. It proceeded from the identity of the enemy to infer action. 
Traffic analysis continues to be used today when identities of the enemy are known or 
suspected, as detailed in the Home Office Operational Case accompanying the 2016 Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill (IPT) on Equipment Interference: 
A group of terrorists are at a training camp in a remote location overseas. The security 
and intelligence agencies have successfully deployed EI [equipment interferences] 
against the devices the group are using and know that they are planning an attack on 
Western tourists in a major town in the same country, but not when the attack is planned 
for. One day, one of the existing devices stop being used. This is probably an indication 
that the group has acquired new devices and gone to town to prepare the attack…86  
Unlike equipment interference, which focuses on a small number of devices, phone metadata 
allows security agencies to conduct time series analysis with Big Data. Anomaly detection 
relies on time coordinates as communications are often collected in of the form ‘A 
communicated with B at time t’ without having to record the content of communications as 
well and therefore place ‘particular emphasis on temporal correlation’.87 Unlike clustering, 
which needs content encoded in features in order to develop anomalies, time series analysis 
does not require content to filter and sort anomalies. With the datafication of more and more 
facets of social existence and the increasing use of communications via the internet, time 
coordinates are gathered about vast amounts of people and make possible the calculation of 
similar and dissimilar events. Bruce Schneier draws attention to NSA programmes that use 
phone metadata to find out anomalous communication behaviour: 
The NSA has a program where it trawls through cell phone metadata to spot phones 
that are turned on, used for a while, and then turned off and never used again. And it 
uses the phones’ usage patterns to chain them together. This technique is employed to 
find “burner” phones used by people who wish to avoid detection.88  
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All temporal anomaly detection works with a model of temporal ordering of sequential data. 
Anomalies are then defined by the absence of ‘temporal continuity’.89 Spikes are produced as 
content-less ‘contextual anomalies […] on the basis of relationships between data values at 
adjacent time instants’90. As spikes can only be produced in relation to a potentially infinite 
number of time instants, even more data needs to be collected than was the case for clustering. 
For example, social media timelines, as recorded by security agencies, can quickly produce 
large amounts of data. Twitter data consists of streamed communications at particular time 
intervals. Twitter itself tries to maintain temporal continuity and detect anomalies early to 
ensure ‘high-fidelity data’ and locate bots and spam91. 
 
 
Figure 3 Anomaly detection in Twitter time series92  
The temporal norm here is similarity of sequential data. A variation in sequential data can 
indicate an anomaly. Unlike traditional military traffic analysis that depended on the 
identification of the enemy, anomaly detection in time series starts with time-stamped activity 
to deduce unusual events as dissimilar ‘spikes’. Without sequential data, it is difficult to 
determine the spikes and then distinguish anomalous spikes from regular one. In security 
practices, message timing and proximity as well as points of user interaction, for instance, have 
been used as measures for temporal similarity.93 However, such a temporal norm is very 
challenging for computers to learn, particularly as noise that appears in  communications needs 
be identified first. Noise makes filtering and sorting time series events very difficult.  
If clustering produced regularity through calculations of similarity as spatial distance, for a 
time series the norm is understood through the production of temporal similarity as sequential 
continuity. Spikes as anomalies are simply a discrepancy represented as discordance from 
temporal continuity in sequential data.  
Networking nodes 
Nodes represent the third materialisation of anomalies that is commonly discussed in the 
computing and security literatures. Networks with their nodes and edges have been pervasive 
techniques of rendering social relations knowable, as they represent relations between 
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interdependent data points.94 Anything that can be modelled as either a node or an edge 
(relationship) between these nodes can be worked into a representation of networks. For 
security professionals, these social networks have played a central role in discovering the 
networks of ‘known extremists’ and identifying their previously unknown contacts.95 The 
techniques of social network analysis have not just been a dominant metaphor in security 
discourse, but performative devices that have rendered risks amenable to intervention through 
enacting and expanding connectivity.96  
Big Data has led to a series of mutations in how security professionals have deployed networks, 
by supplementing traditional social network analysis by anomaly detection. In the UK 
operational case for bulk investigatory powers, the Home Office discusses a successful case of 
contact chaining leading to the discovery of an ‘unknown individual in 2014, in contact with a 
Daesh-affiliated extremist in Syria’.97 For GCHQ, networks are so useful, as  
[c]ontact chaining is the single most common method used for target discovery. Starting 
from a seed selector (…), by looking at the people whom the seed communicates with, 
and the people they in turn communicate with (the 2-out neighbourhood from the seed), 
the analyst begins a painstaking process of assembling information about a terrorist cell 
or network.98 
 
More recently, anomaly detection through network analysis has supplemented contact chaining 
through techniques of finding a modus operandi in the mass of data. Behavioural analysis with 
Big Data and anomaly detection have become increasingly entwined, with ‘pattern matching 
[used] for the fast and reliable detection of known threats while an additional anomaly detection 
module tries to identify yet unknown suspicious activity’.99 If contact chaining started with 
assumptions of a known enemy or potentially risky suspect and extended these assumptions 
through the edges of a network, behaviour-based anomaly detection traces divergences from 
habitual patterns of activity.  
The NSA’s infamously named Skynet application has been publicly debated for identifying 
innocent people as anomalies and potential targets for drone attacks. Documents made public 
by the Intercept showed that NSA analysts were interested in finding ‘similar behaviour’ based 
on an analysis of GSM metadata collected from surveillance of mobile phone networks in 
Pakistan.100 Deemed to work ‘like a typical modern Big Data business application’,101 Skynet 
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collects information on persons of interests as nodes and then relates them with each other as 
edges. To create the nodes and their edges, Skynet uses travel patterns based on mobile phone 
usage patterns such as ‘excessive SIM and Handset swapping’. This modus operandi is 
considered anomalous and indicative of people trying to hide their activities from the 
authorities.  
 
 
Figure 4 Skynet102 
Just like the anomaly detection techniques discussed previously, graph-based methods also use 
distances to split nodes into neighbourhoods. Networks visualise the world of globalisation by 
‘transforming time-based interactions and intervals into spatial representations: they spatialize 
temporal durations and repetitions’.103 However, these distances are measured in terms of 
network topologies rather than geometries or (time-)serial relations. For graphs, the 
neighbourhood is determined by those nodes that are a short ‘hop’ away according to the 
topology. Should the topological attributes of nodes differ significantly from those of other 
nodes in the direct neighbourhood, this is considered to be an indication of anomalies. In social 
network analysis, closely related nodes share interests in a community, which in Skynet’s 
example is a community of fellow travellers. The assumption is that the content of the node is 
also related to its link structure. As Chamayou emphasises, ‘according to this theory, group 
membership and identity can be deduced from the numbers and frequency of contacts, 
regardless of their nature’.104 Fellow travellers are supposed to share common interests. Ahmad 
Zaidan was singled out by Skynet as part of an anomalous topology based on ‘who travels 
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together, have shared contacts, stay overnight with friends, visit other countries, or move 
permanently’.105 Yet, Zaidan is actually the Al Jazeera Bureau Chief in Pakistan.106 
Graph-based anomaly detection techniques target anomalies both in the whole of the graph 
network as well as through ‘closed loops’. Closed loops refer to ‘cliques or near cliques with 
few connections to the remainder of the graph’, which tend to raise the analysts’ suspicion as 
they can be associated with terrorist cells and other target groups.107 For instance, a closed loop 
can refer to persons who call each other frequently but rarely communicate with other group 
members. Anomalies are thus the nodes and their subgraphs that have different topologies from 
other subgraphs in the networks. Similar subgraphs constitute the norm, just as spatial and 
temporal similarities discussed previously produce the normal pattern in a data set.108 
Computers learn what is considered to be topologically normal through network similarities 
that make discrepancies count as anomalies. To this end, computers, for instance, detect the 
largest common subgraph and its boundaries, the most common node patterns, etc. For social 
networks, the topology of the network distinguishes the similar and the dissimilar: ‘[N]odes in 
the graph, which are normally not connected together may show anomalous connections with 
each other’.109 As with spatial and temporal algorithmic techniques, topological anomaly 
detection relies on calculations of similarity and dissimilarity. Anomalies thus stand out from 
patterns of similar connections either by being disconnected or integrated within ‘closed loops’.   
Whether rendered through geometrical distance or topological connectedness, calculations of 
similarity and dissimilarity are indicative of a reconfiguration of the logics of friend/enemy, 
identity/difference, normal/abnormal constitutive of security. Similarity is neither identity nor 
simply difference. It cannot be captured by normality curves, with their deviations from the 
normal. An algorithmic norm is what emerges as similar in spatial terms of proximity, temporal 
terms of sequence or topological terms of connectedness. The production of ‘others’ as 
anomalies does not mean that concerns with identity and difference, friends and enemies, risky 
abnormalities and distributions of normality have been superseded in security practices.110 
While multiple techniques of othering are used by different categories of security professionals, 
as Bigo has shown, the pervasiveness of algorithmic techniques of anomaly detection inserts 
new logics of governing insecurity. What are the implications of targeting anomalies in data 
for governing insecurities? In conclusion, we offer a few remarks on the importance of the 
mutation we have located for critical analyses of security. 
Conclusion: security as logic of (dis)similarity 
This paper has shown that algorithmic practices focussing on ‘finding the needle in the 
haystack’ articulate ‘others’ as anomalies to be detected for the purposes of security 
governance. While the language of anomaly has tended to be used interchangeably with that of 
abnormality, we have argued that anomaly emerges as a supplementary term, which 
reconfigures binaries of normality/abnormality, identity/difference or friend/enemy. To 
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understand the specificity of anomaly, we have brought together a brief genealogy of anomalies 
with an analysis of practices of anomaly detection for security purposes.  
As historians and philosophers of science have shown, anomaly cannot be subsumed to 18th-
century understandings of the normal and the abnormal. For Canguilhem, anomaly had a 
specific meaning in medicine and biology, which was not reducible to abnormality or 
pathology. Although Canguilhem’s distinction between descriptive anomaly and normative 
abnormality is problematic, his understanding of anomaly in etymological terms as asperity or 
unevenness of a terrain introduces a different understanding of regularity. In this sense, we 
have argued that anomaly does not simply blur the boundaries between normality and 
abnormality; it introduces a different logic of calculating regularity, which is not simply based 
on the normal curve, but on calculations of similarity and dissimilarity. In practice, we have 
shown how computational techniques of anomaly detection differ from traditional statistical 
techniques of outlier exclusion. For statistics, outliers challenged the distribution of normality 
and abnormality and were supposed to be eliminated as either error or noise. Today, anomalies 
have become one of the key objects of security professionals’ (and computer scientists’) 
interest and techniques of anomaly detection have increasingly relied on machine learning and 
Big Data algorithms. Anomalies have become particularly desirable for security professionals 
in their promise to capture the ‘unknown unknowns’, as documents leaked by Snowden as well 
as public debates and declassified material show. Understanding the algorithmic subject as an 
anomaly and security logics as similarity/dissimilarity raises new questions for critical analyses 
of security. These concern our existing analytical vocabularies and methodological devices to 
intervene in problematising the production of anomalous dots, spikes and nodes. 
Firstly, anomaly detection needs to be understood in relation to the problematisation of Big 
Data that DARPA raised in relation to the Fort Hood shootings. If security professionals require 
access to more and more extensive amounts of data, the exponential increase in data is also a 
problem as too much data becomes difficult if not impossible to process. Anomaly detection 
filters increasingly large amounts of data into ‘actionable information’. Anomalies are thus not 
good or truthful information, but they make actions manageable for security professionals by 
filtering the mass of collected data. While critical security studies have problematised the 
security professionals’ claims to objective knowledge, anomaly detection does not purport to 
achieve truthful knowledge. Unpacking the techniques of anomaly detection questions the 
perceived ‘promise of algorithmic objectivity’ and shows how uncertainty is radically 
embedded within algorithmic reasoning.111  
Secondly, the production of others as anomalies through logics of similarity and dissimilarity 
introduces different practices from the ones of abnormality classification or the transformation 
of difference into dangerous otherness. As we have shown through an analysis of three 
dominant techniques of anomaly detection, which focus on spatial, temporal and topological 
algorithmic practices, anomalies are produced as dots, spikes and nodes. They are represented 
in artificial spaces and depend upon geometrical or topological calculations of distance. 
Anomaly detection presupposes the production of normality as similarity through spatial 
techniques of proximity calculations, temporal techniques of sequence tracing and topological 
techniques of networking nodes. Dots, spikes and nodes offer different vocabularies of 
otherness. Algorithmic security has not only relinquished the desire for normalising the ‘other’, 
but calculations of spatial, temporal and topological similarity seemingly bypass the negative 
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polarity of racialised and gendered othering. Yet, this does not mean that algorithmic security 
produces less inequality, harm or discrimination – the question for us is how we will reconnect 
vocabularies of dots, spikes and nodes with the production of inequality and discrimination.  
 
Thirdly, the production of anomalies challenges practices of democratic disputes and 
‘democratic curiosity’.112 As security practices are focused on continuous calculations of 
similarity and dissimilarity through algorithmic techniques, there are no categories that can 
become the focus of disputes and claims to rights, accountability and justification. As Alain 
Desrosières has famously argued, statistics could be politicised through its ‘stable collective 
objects, or the production of categories that can become evaluated and contested publicly’.113 
Representations of enmity have also been contested both for intensifying exceptional dynamics 
and for their exclusionary effects. Unlike the categories of statistics or the narratives of 
identity/difference, the continually emergent similarity calculations remain invisible, often 
even to the data analysts themselves. It is thus not surprising that disputes have emerged around 
particular individuals rather than categories and have taken the form of legal action. On 30 
March 2017, Ahmad Zaidan and Bilal Kareem brought legal action against Donald Trump and 
the US government for being selected for targeting on the basis of algorithms.114 As we had 
seen, Zaidan has found out about his targeting by the NSA Skynet programme from documents 
revealed by Snowden. Whether the case will extend the disputes around algorithmic techniques 
of anomaly detection remains to be seen. 
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